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NOTES
IN CASES INVOLVING SITES OF RELIGIOUS
SIGNIFICANCE, PLAINTIFFS WILL FALL IN THE GAP OF
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE THAT EXISTS BETWEEN THE
RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
JeffPinter*

I. Introduction
In Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 1 the Ninth Circuit held that a
government agency did not violate the Establishment Clause when it refused
to purchase materials from a private mining company in part because the
mining activities were destroying an important Native American religious site.
Native American religions are unique in that they often require access to
specific sites of land in order to be practiced.2 Interestingly, however, if the
government agency in Cholla had decided to help finance the destruction of
the religious site by purchasing mining materials, then the Native Americans
would have been equally unsuccessful under a Free Exercise Clause claim.
This note uses Cholla to demonstrate a gap in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on the Religion Clauses. Namely, if the litigation involves land
of historical, cultural, and religious significance, then nearly any plaintiff will
lose under his or her respective Establishment Clause or Free Exercise Clause
claim.
This gap is noteworthy because, absent judicial authority under the
Religion Clauses, government agencies and actors have broad discretion to
protect or destroy religious sites. The relationship between the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment is frequently described as a "tug of war."3
This note challenges the oft-cited metaphor when litigation involves land of

* Second-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. The author would like
to thank Professor Helton for his vision and encouragement. The author would also like to thank
his wife, Carrie, whose patience and love make dreams come true.
This note received the 2004-2005 Salem Civil Rights Award.
1. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2004).
2. E.g., Natural Arch & Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1210 (D. Utah
2002).
3. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 292 (Foundation Press, 2d ed.
2003) (1998).
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cultural, historic, and religious significance and posits, instead, that the
Religion Clauses merely give a rough structure to the government's
relationship with religion. One clause establishes a floor at which government
prohibition of religion becomes impermissible. The other clause erects a
ceiling at which the government's accommodation or support of religion
becomes unconstitutional. Between this floor and ceiling, the government's
action is virtually unchecked by the judiciary. Cholla is the principle case
through which this theory will be tested.
Part II of this note will provide a brief overview of the Court's current
jurisprudence on the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses independently
from one another. It will then analyze how these clauses have been applied
in cases involving land of cultural, historical, and religious significance. Part
II will also briefly discuss the Court's view of the relationship between the
Religion Clauses. Part ll provides an in-depth analysis of Cholla itself. Part
IV posits the Native American tribes as a hypothetical plaintiff in Cholla and
demonstrates how they would fail under the Court's current jurisprudence.
Part IV also analyzes the impact of the gap between the Religion Clauses and
argues that such a reading of the First Amendment is not only textual, but is
also the most democratic reading of the clauses.
II. The Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment
The Religion Clauses provide that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. ..."
The Court has recently acknowledged that "[t]hese two clauses . . .are
frequently in tension."5 The Court also stated, however, that "'there is room
for play in the joints' between them."'6 "In other words, there are some state
actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free
7
Exercise Clause.",
Before examining the relationship between the Religion Clauses, it is
important to first understand how each clause has been interpreted
independently from the other. This part will briefly outline the Court's
current Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence as
relevant to the issue at hand.8

4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004).
6. Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
7. Id.
8. A full analysis of the Court's jurisprudence on either clause is a topic worthy of
volumes. This note is not dedicated to such an exhaustive discussion. Rather, this discussion

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol29/iss2/3

No. 2]

NOTES

A. The EstablishmentClause: An Unstable Ceiling
The Court's current Establishment Clause jurisprudence might be best
described as a constitutional battleground. Each Supreme Court Justice
appears to have his or her own meaning about what the Clause does or should
This has led to the creation of multiple tests, shifting groups of
mean.
Justices embracing each test, and overall, an Establishment Clause
jurisprudence that is a nightmare for scholars, lawyers, and lower courts
alike. 9 History and founding fathers are often mustered like munitions in
support of the different interpretations of the Clause, and are used as both
artillery and armor.'0 This section is a brief analysis of the several tests that
courts have applied to cases involving sites of cultural, historical, and
religious significance.
1. Pick a Test, Any Test
In 1971, the Court began manufacturing Establishment Clause tests."
Scholars disagree on the actual number of tests that have been created and
employed by the Court over the past three decades. Many scholars contend
that no fewer than three tests currently hold favor with the Court 2 , while
others place the number at six. 3 Still other scholars argue that more tests
exist, which were not included in either of the previous calculations.' 4
While the Court's inability to articulate and follow a particular test has
been the subject of much scholarly criticism, 5 this note does not address that
topic. Rather, this Note will only briefly outline the tests applicable to the

will be limited in scope to the issue at hand and the author will defer to those worthy scholars
who have addressed the clauses more exhaustively.
9. See FARBER, supra note 3, at 286.
10. E.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (compare the majority and dissenting
opinions).
11. The author acknowledges that the Court had applied certain tests that would become
the three parts of Lemon prior to 1971. However, 1971 marked the beginning of the era in
which the Court prolifically articulated new tests.
12. E.g., FARBER, supra note 3, at 286.
13. Adam M. Conrad, Hanging the Ten Commandments on the Wall SeparatingChurch
and State: Toward a New Establishment ClauseJurisprudence,38 GA. L. REv. 1329, 1339-47
(2004).
14. E.g., Monica Vila, ConstitutionalLaw: Thou Shalt Not Establish Religion, 56 FLA. L.
REv. 819, 820-21 (1993).
15. E.g., Conrad, supra note 13; Vila, supra note 14; Linda P. McKenzie, The Pledge of
Allegiance: One Nation Under God?, 46 ARIZ. L. REv. 379 (2004).
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issue at hand, and will defer to more capable scholars who have dedicated
their work to these issues.
a) The Lemon Test
The Court articulated the first, and one of the most significant
Establishment Clause tests in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 6 In Lemon, the Court
considered "the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years,"
from which it gleaned three tests. 7 "First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion, finally, the statute must not foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion."' "
If a statute or
government action fails any one of these three tests, then it violates the
Establishment Clause.1 9
Lemon was the clear governing test for Establishment Clause cases for most
of the next twenty years.2" "To date, it has never been overruled, and it still
receives favorable mention in some majority opinions."2
But despite the Lemon test's longevity and frequent application, "the test
has come under heavy fire."2 One of the greatest problems with Lemon is the
difficulty judges have in applying the test to the particular circumstances of
different cases. 3 This difficulty in application has led to inconsistent opinions
and "incomprehensible results."24 "[N]o fewer than five of the currently
sitting Justices have, in their own opinions, personally driven a pencil through
the creature's heart ....

16. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
17. Id. at 612.
18. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).

19. Id. at 613.
20. FARBER, supra note 3, at 280.
21. Id.
22. Conrad, supra note 13, at 1339 (citing County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
592 (1989)).
23. FARBER, supra note 3, at 280.
24. Conrad, supra note 13, at 1340.
25. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia,
Thomas, JJ., concurring). (Scalia comparing the Lemon test to a "ghoul in a late-night horror
movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and
buried.").
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b) The Endorsement Test

One prominent alternative to the Lemon test is the endorsement test,
proposed by Justice O'Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly.26 Justice O'Connor
stated that the "Establishment Clause prohibits government from making
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the
political community."27 To determine whether the state has endorsed religion
under O'Connor's "refined" Lemon analysis, the Court must examine what the
state intended to communicate, and whether the practice in fact conveys a
message of endorsement or disapproval.28 The subjective component, the
intention of the speaker, can be judged by "examining the context of the
statement or asking questions of the speaker."29 The actual message conveyed
by the government, the objective component, can be spotted by looking for
practices "that make non-adherents 'outsiders' and elevate adherents to
favored members of the political community."3
Like the Lemon test that O'Connor sought to clarify, the endorsement test
has been the subject of substantial criticism.3 The endorsement test has not
been applied with much consistency and has an uncertain future, similar to the
Lemon test.
c) The Coercion Test
In 1992, Justice Kennedy introduced yet another test to determine whether
government conduct was consistent with the Religion Clauses. In Lee v.
Weisman,32 a junior high school student challenged her school district's
decision to "invite members of the clergy to offer invocation and benediction
prayers as part of the formal graduation ceremonies for middle schools and for
high schools."33
The Court held that the school district's conduct in Lee was forbidden by
the Establishment Clause because "[s]tate officials direct the performance of
a formal religious exercise" and "attendance and participation in the state-

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
Lynch,
31.
32.
33.

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 690.
Id.
Conrad, supra note 13, at 1341 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985);
465 U.S. at 688).
See FARBER, supra note 3, at 284, for some of these criticisms.
505 U.S. 577 (1992).
Id. at 580.
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sponsored religious activity are... obligatory."34 After finding attendance to
be "obligatory," the Court stated "that prayer exercises in public schools carry
a particular risk of indirect coercion."35 The Court reasoned that what might
appear innocent to most believers, "in a school context may appear to the
nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to employ the machinery of the State
to enforce a religious orthodoxy." 36
The Court again declined to dismiss or review any previous Establishment
Clause tests. Instead, the Lee Court elected to distinguish its facts from earlier
cases and to create a new test, the coercion test.
Similar to the previous tests, the coercion test has been criticized for its
impracticality, "coercion" being a very pliable concept.37 For example, some
might view student prayers before a football game as merely an invitation,
while others may see it as an offer that cannot be refused.38 If the
Establishment Clause protects only against religious coercion, does the Free
Exercise Clause prohibition of religious coercion make it superfluous.39
d) Accommodation
While accommodation may or may not have enough support to exist as a
freestanding test, " there isstrong support for incorporating the principles of
accommodation into other tests and evaluations of government conduct.4 ' The
Supreme Court "has long recognized that the government may (and sometimes
must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without violating
The Constitution "actually mandates
the Establishment Clause. 42
accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility
Accommodation plays an important part in the application
towards any."'43
of the traditional Lemon test. The secular purpose prong of Lemon "does not

34. Id. at 586.
35. Id. at 592.
36. Id.
37. FARBER, supra note 3, at 286.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Conrad, supra note 13, at 1344-45. Conrad contends that Rehnquist proposed
accommodation as an alternative to Lemon in his dissent in Wallace. This author disagrees with
that contention.
41. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1454 (D. Wyo. 1998).
42. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987).
43. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
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mean that the law's purpose must be unrelated to religion." Rather, it is a
permissible "purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with
the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious
missions."45 Courts have interpreted this language to mean that "[a]ccommodation of a religious minority to let them practice their religion without
penalty is a lawful secular purpose."46
Also, "[a]ccommodation plays a role in considering whether the principal
effect of a policy is to advance religion."4 7 "A law is not unconstitutional
simply because it allows churches to advance religion, which is their very
purpose. For a law to have forbidden 'effects' under Lemon, it must be fair
to say that the government itself has advanced religion through its own
activities or influence.""
Regardless of where accommodation fits into a court's analytical
framework, it has clearly broadened the scope of judicial deference to
government agencies in situations involving land of cultural, historical, and
religious significance.4 9 In other words, accommodation has effectively raised
the ceiling imposed by the Establishment Clause to check the conduct of
government actors.
e) Conclusion
What is the practical impact of the Court's inability to agree on one
particular test? The answer is judicial freedom at the expense of clarity and
consistency. Consider the approaches of the Tenth and Ninth Circuit Courts
of Appeal.
The Tenth Circuit has formed a hybrid test, combining "both the purpose
and the effect test, together with the entanglement criterion imposed by
Lemon."5 The Tenth Circuit also states that the "government's ability to
accommodate religious beliefs is an important consideration" when evaluating
the purpose and effect prongs of the endorsement test.5 So, in Establishment

44. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).
45. Id. at 336.
46. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Kong v.
Scully, 341 F.3d 1132, 1140 (9th Cir. 2003)).
47. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1455 (D. Wyo. 1998).
48. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 337.
49. See supra Part II.
50. Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 552 (10th Cir. 1997).
51. Natural Arch & Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1222 (D. Utah 2002)
(quoting Bauchman, 132 F.3d at 552).
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Clause cases, the Tenth Circuit applies a combination of the Lemon and
endorsement tests and sprinkles in some accommodation.
The Ninth Circuit summarized its freedom by stating, "We are free to apply
any or all of the three tests [the Lemon test, the endorsement test, or the
coercion test], and to invalidate any measure that fails any one of them." 2 So,
according to the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court's current Establishment
Clause jurisprudence permits lower courts to pick any test, or variations or
combinations of any tests according to their discretion. A judicial skeptic
might comment that, under such a rule,judges are free to decide the case apart
from the law and then need only pull out the menu of Establishment Clause
tests and pick the one most suitable to those ends.
2. Native Americans and the Establishment Clause
Theoretically, courts apply the same Establishment Clause law to cases
involving Native Americans to all other cases. However, the practical
application of that law is slightly different as applied to Native Americans for
several reasons.
First, Native American tribes are not purely religious entities, and therefore,
government conduct is less likely to "establish" any tribal religion. When
determining whether government conduct violates the Lemon test, "the Court
must look at 'the character and purpose of the institutions that are benefited,
the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship
between the government and religious authority."'' 53 "The organizations
benefited by the [government conduct], namely Native American tribes, are
not solely religious organizations, but also represent a common heritage and
culture. As a result, there is much less danger that the Government's actions
will inordinately advance solely religious activities." 4 It is virtually
impossible to draw a line between the "religious" and the "cultural or
,historical" practices associated with a sacred site. 5 So at least under the
Lemon test, government conduct favoring native religions is less likely to run
afoul of the Establishment Clause. 6
52. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 607 (9th Cir. 2002).
53. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1456 (D. Wyo. 1998)
(quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 615 (1971)).
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., id. at 1450.
56. Interestingly, the rationale that the establishment of religion is less likely when the
government action benefits Native Americans, which are historical and cultural entities as well
as religious, may be analogous to and supported by Lynch, where the Court determined that
Christian holiday symbols were less likely to "establish" any religion where the scene also
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Secondly, the significance of Native American sacred sites is not limited
to religious reasons. Because of the unique role that Native American
societies have played in the nation's history and the central role that religion
played in those societies, almost any Native American religious site will also
have cultural and historical significance." Protecting this nation's cultural
and historical landmarks is deemed to be constitutional government action,
even if cultural and historical site also has religious significance.58 Therefore,
if a government actor wishes to protect a Native American sacred site without
violating the Establishment Clause, it need only phrase the protection so that
it appears to be protecting the site for cultural and historical reasons.
Third, Congress and state legislatures have acted affirmatively in an effort
to protect Native Americans and their religious sites.59 "It is incumbent upon
the [government] to fulfill its important trust responsibilities to American
Indians."6
These trust responsibilities factor in when the courts seek to
determine the constitutionality of the government action that allegedly
"establishes" a native religion.
a) Establishment Clause Tests and Native American SacredSites
The following provides a glimpse of those cases involving Establishment
Clause challenges to government decisions to protect sites of cultural,
historical, and religious importance to Native Americans. These cases
illustrate how the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been
applied by lower courts.
In Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass 'n v. Babbitt,6' the National Park Service
(NPS) issued a Final Climbing Management Plan (the Plan) "'to protect the
natural and cultural resources of Devil's Tower [National Monument] and to
provide for visitor enjoyment and appreciation of this unique feature."' 62 Part
of the Plan provided that "'in respect for the reverence many American
Indians hold for Devil's Tower as a sacred site, rock climbers will be asked

included Santa Claus and other non-religious, holiday decorations. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668 (1984). Just as the holiday display in Lynch promoted both secular and religious
symbols, assisting a Native American tribe promotes the cultural and historical purposes of the
tribe as well its religious purposes.
57. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 976 (9th Cir. 2004).
58. Id.
59. See also Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999).
60. Natural Arch & Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1226 (D. Utah 2002).
61. 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448 (D. Wyo. 1998).
62. Id. at 1450.
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on Devil's Tower during the culturally
to voluntarily refrain from climbing
63
significant month of June."'
The Plan was apparently the NPS's attempt to balance competing interests
at Devil's Tower. Recreational climbing at Devil's Tower was a growing
venture, and June was one of the most popular months for the activity.' On
the other hand, Native Americans "complained that the presence of climbers
on the sacred butte and the placement of bolts in the rock has adversely
impacted their traditional activities and seriously impaired the spiritual quality
of the site. 65
The District Court of Wyoming held that the voluntary climbing ban was
a legitimate exercise of the agency's discretion in managing Devil's Tower.
The court successfully balanced the competing needs of individuals using the
Tower without violating the Constitution.66 In reaching its decision, the court
reviewed the agency's conduct through a confusing Lemon/endorsement/
coercion test.67 The court also included the government's ability to
accommodate religious practices in the analysis.68
The court employed a three-part analysis. First, the court found that the ban
was designed "to remove barriers to religious worship occasioned by public
ownership of the Tower," which "is in the nature of accommodation, not
promotion, and consequently is a legitimate secular purpose. 69 Second, the
Plan satisfied the second prong because it was a reasonable accommodation
of religion, not coercion.7" Third, the Plan did not constitute excessive
entanglement with religion largely because the tribes involved were not
"solely religious organizations, but also represent a common heritage and
71
culture."
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing
and dismissed the climber's complaint.7 2 The Tenth Circuit's opinion flags

63. Id at 1450.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1457.
67. Id. at 1454. The court stated that the appropriate combination was to combine Lemon
and the endorsement test, but then went on to include "actual coercion" and "indicia of
coercion" in its analysis. Id. at 1456.
68. Id. at 1454.
69. Id. at 1455.
70. Id. at 1455-56.
71. Id. at 1456.
72. Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 822.
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another difficulty that many plaintiffs encounter when bringing Establishment
Clause claims, the issue of standing.73
In Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass 'n v. Independent Petroleum Ass 'n of
America,7 4 the Independent Petroleum Association of America (IPAA)
challenged the United States Forest Service's decision not to offer particular
lands within the Lewis & Clark National Forest for oil and gas leasing based
on the Establishment Clause. 75 The IPAA argued "that the Forest Service's
on the current use of the land for
decision not to lease the land was based
' 76
Native American religious practices.
The court held that the agency's decision was constitutional under the
three-part Lemon test. 77 First, the Forest Service's decision had a secular

purpose, including protecting the value of the land and wildlife, conserving
natural resources, and not adversely affecting tourism and recreational uses of
the land. 71 "Second, the primary purpose and effect of the decision not to
lease was to protect the Rocky Mountain Division from oil and gas
exploration, not to advance Native American religious beliefs., 79 Third, there
The court went on to note that
was no excessive entanglement.8 "
accommodation of religious practices was consistent with the Establishment
Clause, and that the agency's decision would not violate the endorsement
test. 8'

Although the Rocky Mountain opinion did not give a detailed

background of the facts, the Forest Service may have based its decision on the
religious significance of the land but avoided confrontation with the
Establishment Clause by phrasing its decision as designed to protect the
natural or historical importance of the site.
In Natural Arch & Bridge Society v. Alston, 2 the court reviewed the
National Park Service's General Management Plan (GMP), which was an
attempt to protect Rainbow Bridge. Rainbow Bridge is a unique natural
wonder of "national and international significance."83 Rainbow Bridge is also

73. In both of the next two cases, the plaintiffs also had to overcome standing issues.
74. No. 0035349, 2001 WL 470022 (9th Cir. May 3, 2001) (not selected for publication).
75. Id. at * 1. The Establishment Clause claim was not the only claim made, but is the only
claim relevant to this discussion.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *1-*2.
78. Id. at *1.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at*l-*2.
82. Natural Arch & Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Utah 2002).
83. Id. at 1210.
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AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 29

a sacred place to many Native Americans." Large increases in tourism
adversely impacted the site, causing erosion, damage to cultural and
archaeological sites, pollution, and desecration to the sanctity of the bridge to
surrounding Native American tribes.85 The GMP sought to counteract many
of those adverse effects, and part of the plan sought to educate the public
concerning the cultural and religious significance of the bridge to Native
Americans.86 Several individuals and organizations filed a complaint, alleging
that the GMP violated the Establishment Clause. 7
The NaturalArch court stated that O'Connor's endorsement test "appears
to be the predominate test when evaluating Establishment Clause claims," but
that courts in the Tenth Circuit'sjurisdiction must follow precedent and apply
both the endorsement test and the excessive entanglement prong of the
traditional Lemon test.88 The Natural Arch court acknowledged the
importance of accommodation in reviewing the constitutionality of the
agency's conduct.8 9 The court then analyzed the GMP according to its
modified three-part test.
First, the court stated that the plaintiff must show that the GMP has "no
clearly secular purpose or that in spite of the existence of a legitimate secular
purpose(s), the defendant's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of
religion."9 The court found that the GMP's purpose was not to "establish,
promote, or advance religion," but rather it had a legitimate secular purpose
to "educate and inform the public about different cultures and increase
sensitivity to the beliefs of others."91
Second, the court stated that the GMP did not have the impermissible effect
of endorsing or disapproving a religion.92 Instead, the effect of the policy, like
its purpose, was merely "informational."9 3 The court rejected the plaintiff's

84. Id.
85. Idat 1213.
86. Id. at 1213-14.
87. Id. at 1215. Again, the Establishment Clause claim was not the only claim, but it is the
only claim relevant to this note. Also, there were multiple plaintiffs initially, but many of them
lacked standing and were dismissed. Id.
88. Id. at 1222.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1223 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
91. Id.at 1223-24.
92. Id. at 1224.
93. Id.
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argument that the GMP used social pressure to coerce conformity to a Native
American religious practice.94
Third, the court held that the GMP did not violate the excessive
entanglement prong of the test." The court noted that Native American tribes
are not purely religious entities but are also cultural and social and, therefore,
excessive entanglement is less likely to result from government aid to the
tribes.96 The court stated that, "although the Park Service may have consulted
with Native American tribes concerning the social, cultural, and religious
importance of Rainbow Bridge, it is incumbent upon the park to do so to
fulfill its important trust responsibilities to American Indians."9 7
b) Conclusion
The previous discussion illustrates the difficulty that plaintiffs encounter
when bringing an Establishment Clause claim against a government agency,
when that agency acts favorably towards sites important to Native Americans.
If the plaintiff successfully overcomes the hurdle of standing (which is no
small feat), then the government agency can often win by explaining its
conduct in historical, cultural, or preservationist language, regardless of how
the site's religious importance factored into the decision-making process. In
short, absent carelessness or obtuse religious favoritism on an agency's part,
the plaintiff challenging the action will lose.
B. The Free Exercise Clause: the Floor
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment states that Congress shall
make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion.9" As with the
Establishment Clause, the proper interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause
is hotly contested among scholars as well as the Justices of the Supreme
Court. Nonetheless, this section will only provide a glimpse of the Supreme
Court's Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence sufficient to address the issues at
hand.99
94. Id. at 1224-25.
95. Id. at 1225.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1226.
98. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
99. This section does not attempt to give a full analysis of the Court's Free Exercise
jurisprudence. Such a feat is the topic of other articles and unnecessary to the issues involved
in this note. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery ProtectiveAss 'n is directly on point to the
issue at hand and has not been overruled despite other developments in the Court's Free
Exercise Clause jurisprudence.
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The controlling Supreme Court case on the issue of government action
challenged as burdening the free exercise of site specific religious practices
under the Free Exercise Clause is Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
ProtectiveAss 'n.100 In Lyng, Native Americans'' challenged as a violation of
the Free Exercise Clause, the decision of the United States Forest Service to
permit timber harvesting in and construction of a road through a portion of a
national forest that had traditionally been used for religious purposes by three
Native American tribes.'0 2 The Forest Service decided to carry out its
construction plans despite recommendations from the Forest Service's own
commission that the road should not be completed because it "'would cause
serious and irreparable damages to the sacred areas which are an integral 0and
°3
necessary part of the belief systems and lifeway of... Indian peoples.""
The Lyng Court held that the government was not "prohibiting" the free
exercise of religion in violation of the First Amendment, despite the "severe
adverse effects" that the conduct would have on the tribes' ability to practice
their religion."° The Lyng Court relied heavily on an earlier Free Exercise
case for the precedent that the "Free Exercise Clause affords an individual
protection from certain forms of government compulsion; it does not afford
an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government's internal
procedures." 0 5 The Court sympathized with the Native Americans' plight and
acknowledged that "the challenged Government action would interfere
significantly with private persons' ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment
according to their own religious beliefs."'0 6 However, the Forest Service's
decision to build the road would not "coerce" the Native Americans "into
violating their religious beliefs; nor would [it] penalize religious activity by
denying any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges
enjoyed by other citizens."' 7 Absent such results, the Forest Service's
conduct did not "prohibit" the free exercise of religion in violation of the First
Amendment.

100. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1987).
101. The actual challengers included not only Indian organizations, but also individual
Indians, nature organizations, individual members of those nature organizations, and the State
of California. Id. at 443. For the sake of brevity and simplicity, the author adopted "Native
Americans" as a generic term for all challengers.
102. Id. at 441-42.
103. Id. at442.
104. Id. at447.
105. Id. at 448 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1986)).
106. Id. at 449.
107. Id.
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The Lyng Court focused on the text of the First Amendment, stating that the
word "prohibit" in the Free Exercise Clause was written to express "what the
government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual
can exact from the government."' 8 To hold otherwise, would give individuals
"a veto over public programs" when those programs do not actually prohibit
the free exercise of religion. " "Whatever rights the Indians may have to the
use of the area, however, those rights do not divest the Government of its right
to use what is, after all, its land.""o
The Court refused to read more into the Constitution in order to reconcile
the competing demands on government, many of which arose from sincere
religious belief. "' The majority seemed hesitant to leave the tribes to the
goodwill of the legislature, but the Court did not want the burden of deciding
"which public lands are 'central' or 'indispensable' to which religions," or
deciding which infringements were outweighed by government interests. "12
The Court noted that such decisions belonged in the hands of "the legislature
'1 3
and other institutions."
Writing for the dissent, Justice Brennan challenged the majority's
definition of what constituted "prohibiting" religion, for the government's
conduct in Lyng "threatens the very existence of a Native American
religion."' " The dissent remarked on the unique nature of Native American
religions, which are "inextricably bound to the use of land."' '" Critiquing the
majority's reliance on a lack of coercion behind the government action, the
dissent stated that "religious freedom is threatened no less by government
action that makes the practice of one's chosen faith impossible than by
government programs that pressure one to engage in conduct inconsistent with
religious beliefs.""' 6 Because the government conduct in Lyng will effectively
dissenters
preclude the Native Americans from practicing their religion, the
7
would grant them the protections of the Free Exercise Clause. "

108. Id.at 451.
109. Id. at 452.
110. Id. at 453 (citing Bowen v. Roy 476 U.S. 693,724-27 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)).
111. Id. at 452.
112. Id. at 457.
113. Id.at 452.
114. Id. at 458 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
115. Id. at 460-61 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
116. Id. at 468 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, JR., dissenting).
117. Id. at 469 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
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Despite the broad deference granted to the executive and legislative
branches by Lyng, government conduct does not go completely unchecked in
the Court's current Free Exercise jurisprudence. Consider the following two
cases.
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith,' 18 the Court stated that the government may not ban [religious] "acts or
abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only
because of the religious belief that they display," such as a law that prohibited
bowing down before a golden calf. However, the Court noted that it had
"never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance
with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate."' 19 In other words, the Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit the
state from passing a "valid and neutral law of general applicability," even if
that law adversely affects religion or religious practices. 120
Second, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah provides that
government action may not single out religion for unfavorable treatment
unless there is some compelling government interest and the law is narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest. 121 In Hialeah, the city "made it a crime to
engage in certain kinds of animal slaughter.' 22 The Court "found that the law
2
sought to suppress ritualistic animal sacrifices of the Santeria religion.'1
Since the city's law was not neutral and generally applicable and because the
law had no compelling government interest, the Court held that the action
24
violated the Free Exercise Clause.
Lyng, Smith, and Hialeah combine to hold that Native Americans have no
recourse under the Free Exercise Clause to prevent the government from
destroying or permitting the destruction of sacred sites, unless the government
action targets a particular religion or religious practice.

118. 494 U.S. 872, 877-78 (1990).
119. Id. at 878-79.
120. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 (1982)(Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgement)).
121. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-532 (1993).
122. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720 (2004) (summarizing Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 526).
123. Id. at 720 (citing Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 535).
124. Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 546-47.
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C. Locke v. Davey: A Play in the Joints
In Locke v. Davey, 25 the Court addressed the relationship between the
Religion Clauses. The Court noted that "the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause, are frequently in tension."'' 26 Despite this tension,
"'there is room for play in the joints' between them."1 27 "In other words, there
are some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required
by the Free Exercise Clause. 128
In Locke, the Court upheld the State of Washington's Promise Scholarship
Program (the Program), which awarded state money to academically gifted
students for post-secondary education expenses. 129 However, students were
not permitted to "use the scholarship at an institution where they are pursuing
a degree in devotional theology."' 13 The plaintiff was a student who met the
Program's eligibility requirements but wished to use the scholarship to pursue
a degree in devotional theology. 3 ' The student was denied scholarship funds
and brought an action, claiming that "the denial of his scholarship funds based
on his decision to pursue a theology degree violated, inter alia, the Free
Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment ....,132
The Locke Court stated that the case before it involved "that 'play in the
joints' described above.' 33 The Court declared, "there is no doubt that the
State could, consistent with the Federal Constitution, permit Promise Scholars
",13 In other words, the State
to pursue a degree in devotional theology ....
could have awarded the scholarship money to students, like the plaintiff,
pursuing a devotional theology degree without violating the Establishment
Clause.

135

The issue before the Court, then, was whether the State, consistent with the
Free Exercise Clause, could deny funding to only those students pursuing a

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

540 U.S. 712 (2004).
Id.at 718.
Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
Id. at 718-19.
Id. at 715.
Id.
Id. at 717.
Id. at 718.
Id. at 719.
Id.
Id.
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theological degree.'3 6 Although the State's Program was not neutral on its
face, the Court declined to extend the Free Exercise Clause to "fund a distinct
category of instruction."' 37 "[T]he State's disfavor of religion (if it can be
called that) ... imposes neither criminal nor civil sanctions on any type of
religious service or rite... [a]nd it does not force students to choose between
their religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit."' 38 Such a ruling
seems inconsistent with Smith and Hialeahbecause the Scholarship Program
was not neutral and generally applicable, but rather, the Program
discriminated on its face.' 39 However, the majority did not rule the Program
unconstitutional, at least in40part because the Program's discrimination only
mildly disfavored religion.
In conclusion, the Locke Court admitted that there was some play between
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. Additionally, Locke appears to
modify the Court's holding in Hialeahby stating that a facially discriminatory
law may not be presumptively unconstitutional if its "disfavor of religion" is
"milder" than was present in Hialeah.141
11. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish
A. Statement of the Case
Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. (Cholla) owned a portion of Woodruff Butte,
located in East Central Arizona. 41 Cholla mined Woodruff Butte for " unique
and valuable aggregate that is used primarily for the construction of roads and
bridges."' 143 "Shortly after mining operations began, the Hopi Tribe, Zuni
Pueblo, and Navajo Nation (collectively, the Tribes) passed resolutions
against the mining because of Woodruff Butte's religious, cultural, and
historical significance to these groups."'"
The Arizona Department of
Transportation (ADOT) granted Cholla a commercial source number, which

136. Id.
137. Id.at 721.
138. Id. at 720-21 (citations omitted).
139. Id. at 726 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 720.
141. Id.
142. Appellant's Brief at 5, Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2004)
(No. 03-15423).
143. Id.
144. Cholla, 382 F.3d at 972.
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permitted Cholla to sell materials mined at Woodruff Butte to ADOT for use
in state highway construction projects.'45
In response to "a variety of disputes and litigation" concerning the mining
of Woodruff Butte, the ADOT sought to discourage the use of the materials
from Woodruff Butte in future state construction projects.'4 6 Accordingly,
ADOT promulgated new commercial source regulations under which 1all
47
existing commercial source numbers would expire at the end of the year.
To obtain a new commercial source number, each applicant had to submit to
an environmental assessment that considered whether the proposed use will
have "major adverse impact on cultural or historical resources."'' 4' A site's
eligibility for listing on the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP)
would be an important factor to consider in granting a commercial source
number. 149 "Woodruff Butte was declared eligible for listing on the
5 Obut Woodruff Butte was not yet listed on the register at the time of
NRHP,"'
151
trial.
"ADOT denied Cholla's application for a new commercial source number
because of the projected adverse effects on historic property on Woodruff
Butte."' 52 Without a commercial source number, Cholla could no longer
provide aggregate materials to ADOT for state highway construction
projects. However, the denial did not prevent Cholla from selling materials
destroying the historic property, which
in the private market or from selling15or
4
was still Cholla's private property.
Cholla sued various government officials alleging that the denial of the
commercial source number "was based solely on the purported sacred
religious significance of Woodruff Butte to several Indian tribes" in violation
of the Establishment Clause. 155 Cholla did not challenge the constitutional
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Appellant's Brief at 8.
148. Appellee's Brief at 5 (citing S.E.R. 11, ADOT Specification 1001-4.01(c)).
149. Cholla, 382 F.3d at 972.
150. Id.
151. Appellant's Brief at 6.
152. Cholla, 382 F.3d at 972.
153. Id. at 973.
154. Appellee's Brief at 8.
155. Id. Cholla made other claims based on federal civil rights laws and the Arizona
Constitution. Largely, the court found these claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment or the
applicable statute of limitations. Nonetheless, this note is not dedicated to these or other issues
arising in Cholla but is dedicated solely to the Establishment Clause claim based on the denial
of the commercial source number.
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validity of the regulation on its face, but rather challenged the regulation on
an as-applied basis.'5 6
The district court dismissed Cholla's Establishment Clause claim on a Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.157 Cholla
appealed.5 8
B. The Holding: Cholla'sEstablishment Clause Claim is Futile
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's dismissal of Cholla's
Establishment Clause claim de novo, and it affirmed.'5 9 The Ninth Circuit
accepted the facts alleged in Cholla's complaint and construed them in the
light most favorable to Cholla.160 Nonetheless, from the court's perspective,
"No evidence could bolster Cholla's Establishment Clause claim because it
161
is premised on flawed analysis of the governing law."'
The court laid out the traditional three-pronged Lemon test, apparently the
foundation of "the governing law.' ' 162 The court also incorporated the
endorsement test, stating, "Particular attention is paid to whether the
challenged action has the purpose or effect of endorsing religion."' 163 The
court relied on accommodation throughout its opinion in finding that ADOT's
conduct did not violate the Establishment Clause.M The court offered no
explanation as to why it selected this particular combination of tests as "the
governing law." However, it is clear that the Civish court
did not violate its
65
precedent when it chose any test that suited its needs. 1
1. Secular Purpose
From the facts of Cholla's complaint, the court found that the "defendant's
actions have the secular purpose of carrying out state construction projects in
a manner that does not harm a site of religious, historical, and cultural
166
importance to several Native American groups and the nation as a whole."'

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
to pick
166.

Id.
Cholla, 382 F.3d at 972-73.
Id. at 973.
Id. at 972-73.
Id. at 975.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989)).
Id. at 975-76.
Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 607 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating the court was free
any or all of the tests).
Cholla, 382 F.3d at 975.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol29/iss2/3

No. 2]

NOTES

The court stated that the secular purpose prong does not mean that the law's
purpose must be unrelated to religion. 167 Rather, "Carrying out government
programs to avoid interference with a group's religious practices is a
legitimate, secular purpose."' 6' The court found that this secular purpose
satisfied the first prong of the Lemon test, such that the court did not need to
of Woodruff Butte as other
bring in the historical and cultural importance
169
conduct.
the
for
purposes
secular
possible
2. PrimaryEffect/Endorsement
The court rejected Cholla's argument that the principal or primary effect of
the defendant's actions was to advance religion. 70 The court cited several
reasons why the defendant's actions did not violate the second prong of the
Lemon test.
First, the court discussed the years of controversy and litigation connected
The court was apparently
with the destruction of Woodruff Butte.'
reasoning that curtailing controversy might have been the primary effect ofthe
government's action. 172 However, the court did not clearly articulate this
point, if that was in fact the reasoning behind that discussion.
Secondly, the court stated that the state's principal or primary effect may
have been to preserve an "important cultural landmark., 173 The court noted
that Native American societies have a unique place in North American history,
and therefore, "protecting Native American shrines and other culturallyimportant sites has historical value for the nation as a whole, much like
Greece's preservation of the Parthenon, an ancient Greek temple of
worship."' 74 The court also noted that religion has played a central role in
human societies, and the Establishment Clause does not require governments
to ignore the value of historical treasures simply because they are or once
were sites of religious worship.175 To illustrate, the court commented that the
United States has protected many religious sites on the NRHP, "including the

167. Id. (quoting Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
168. Id. (quoting Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987); Kong v.
Scully, 341 F.3d 1132, 1140 (9th Cir. 2003)).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 976.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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National Cathedral in Washington D.C.; the Touro Synagogue, America's
oldest standing synagogue... and numerous churches that played a pivotal
role in the Civil Rights Movement, including the Sixteenth Street Baptist
Church in Birmingham, Alabama."' 76 The historically and culturally rich
Woodruff Butte should not be given less protection because it has religious
importance. The state's actions did not violate the second prong of the Lemon
test.
The court held that the defendant's policy did not convey endorsement or
approval of the Tribes' religions in violation of the endorsement test.'77 The
court found no suggestion that the state endorsed or favored tribal religion or
religious sites, or that the state would not protect sites of similar importance
to other groups.' 78 Rather, the state was merely carrying out its state
construction projects "in a way that does not interfere with the Tribes'
religious practices or destroy religious sites that have historical
significance."' 7 9 The court held that accommodation of religion was permitted
under the Establishment Clause. 8 ° The state's conduct did not violate the
endorsement test.
3. Excessive Entanglement
The state's conduct did not violate the third prong of the Lemon test, for
there was no evidence of excessive government entanglement with religion. 8'
The court noted that although the Tribes were consulted in the process of
evaluating Cholla's application for a commercial source number, "some level
of interaction between government and religious communities is inevitable;
entanglement must be 'excessive' to violate the Establishment Clause."' 82 The
court held that Cholla did not allege facts demonstrating "excessive
entanglement" with the Tribes.'83
Additionally, the court noted that in "determining whether government
action creates excessive entanglement with religion, the Supreme Court has
looked to the character and purpose of the institutions benefited.' 8 4 The court

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 976-77 (citations omitted).
Id. at 976.
Id. at 977.
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then cited Bowen v. Kendrick.5 for the proposition that government conduct
is less likely to amount to excessive entanglement if the entities are not
"pervasively sectarian."1" 6 Since Native Americans tribes "are not solely
religious in character or purpose," but are ethnic and cultural in character as
87
well, the state's conduct is less likely to amount to excessive entanglement.'
4. Conclusion
In conclusion, Cholla's complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to justify
a trial to determine whether the state's conduct violated the Establishment
Clause. 88 "[TIhe Establishment Clause does not bar the government from
protecting an historically and culturally important site simply because the
site's importance derives at least in part from its sacredness to certain
groups.' 89
IV Analysis
A. Plaintiffs Always Lose
The previous Establishment Clause analysis' 90 demonstrates just how
fruitless it is for plaintiffs to challenge government conduct that protects
Native American religious sites. The principal case, Cholla,as well as several
other cases, support this proposition.' 9' In order to successfully prove the
thesis of this note, however, it must be proven that Native Americans or other
land-based religious worshipers face an equally daunting task with claims
brought under the Free Exercise Clause. Situations in which neither party
could win under their respective Religion Clause claim point to the existence
of a gap between the clauses.
Similar to the Court's approach in Locke, this gap is best delineated by
creating a hypothetical plaintiff. 192 In Cholla, the landowner challenged the
ADOT's decision to deny him a commercial source number as an

185. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615-16 (1988).
186. Cholla, 382 F.3d at 977.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 975.
189. Id. at 977.
190. See discussion supra Part II.A.
191. Id.
192. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004). In Locke, the Court held that the State did not
violate the Free Exercise Clause when it prohibited funding a student's pursuit of a degree in
devotional theology. But the Court also noted that the State could have chosen to fund such
degrees without violating the Establishment Clause.
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unconstitutional establishment of religion. "' Both the district court and the
Ninth Circuit readily dismissed the landowner's claims on a Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) motion. ' However, if the Native American tribes had initiated the
Cholla litigation under the Free Exercise Clause, then they would have met an
equally unsuccessful fate under Lyng, which is a powerful precedent for any
site-specific worshiper to overcome when bringing a Free Exercise claim.
Assume that the ADOT had granted Cholla a commercial source number
instead of denying it, and that the decision to grant the commercial source
number dramatically increased the rate at which Woodruffe Butte would be
destroyed. Now assume that the Native American tribes had sued the ADOT
under the Free Exercise Clause, alleging that this government decision would
hinder their ability to worship and to engage in important cultural and
religious practices. The tribes' hypothetical Free Exercise claim is analogous
to the plaintiffs' claim in Lyng.
In Lyng, the Court held that the Forest Service did not violate the Free
Exercise Clause when it carried out construction plans that it knew would
have "severe adverse effects" on the tribes' ability to practice their religion. 95
In the court's view, the Free Exercise Clause did not give the tribes a veto
over the internal operations of the government, particularly when such
conduct did not coerce the tribes into violating their religious practices. 196
The government was free to destroy sacred sites, so long as it did not directly
target a religion or attempt to coerce an individual into violating their religious
practices. 19
Undoubtedly, the tribes in the hypothetical Cholla litigation would receive
a similar ruling. In both situations, the government actor made a decision that
adversely affected the tribes' ability to worship. In both situations, the tribes
attempted to restrict the government's internal decision-making freedom via
the Free Exercise Clause. Both government actors had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for making their respective decisions, one to build a
valuable road and the other to supply its highway construction workers with
materials.
The tribes in the hypothetical would likely have a weaker case than the
Forest Service in Lyng because Lyng involved a government decision-maker

193. Appellant's Brief at 8, Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2004)
(No. 03-15423).
194. Cholla, 382 F.3d at 972-73.
195. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 447 (1988).
196. Id. at 449.

197. Id.
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and government property, while Cholla involved a government actor and a
private landowner. This would likely affect the outcome of the case for a
couple ofreasons. First, inLyng, it was actual government workers destroying
the sacred sites. In the hypothetical, the one destroying Woodruffe Butte is
the mining company, a private party. Financing the destruction of Woodruffe
Butte by purchasing aggregate from the mining company logically seems to
"prohibit the free exercise of religion" less than a decision to finance, plan,
manage, and physically carry out the destruction plans in Lyng. Therefore, the
hypothetical involves a lesser degree of state action or state "prohibition" of
religion. Second, the Lyng Court remarked that the Free Exercise Clause did
not empower the tribes to "divest the Government of its right to use what is,
after all, its land."' 98 Under such reasoning, the tribes should have even less
power to use the Free Exercise Clause to divest a private landowner of its
right to use private land. The tribes' claim is clearly an attempt to govern the
mining company's actions indirectly by preventing the government from
buying materials from that land. Reducing the demand for the company's
goods would certainly create an economic disincentive for the company to
mine the aggregate.
Regardless of the path that the court takes to get there, the result will be the
same. The tribes' claim against the government actor under the Free Exercise
Clause will be unsuccessful, similar to the plaintiffs in Lyng. 199 On the other
hand, the landowner suing under the Establishment Clause did not even make
it past a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which is a disfavored
motion. 20
So, Cholla presents a fact scenario in which neither plaintiff could win.
The Locke Court also heard a case in which neither plaintiff would succeed
under their respective Religion Clause claim. 20 1 While not explicitly stated by
the courts, it is likely that neither a Free Exercise Clause nor an Establishment
Clause claim would have succeeded in the Bear Lodge, Rocky Mountain Oil,
or NaturalArch cases as well.20 2

198. Id. at 453.
199. Id. at 447.
200. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 972 (9th Cir. 2004).
201. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004).
202. See discussion of cases in part II(a)(ii) above, Native Americans and the Religion
Clauses.
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B. The Tug of War Rope Between the Religion Clauses Has Been Severed
The discussion in the previous section demonstrates that frequently, in the
context of litigation involving land of cultural, historical, and religious
significance, neither Religion Clause will apply. While historically the
20 3
relationship between the Religion Clauses may have been a tug of war,
recent developments on the Court seem to have separated the clauses.
First, the strength of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
whichever test the Court may decide to apply, has been softened by its
adoption of accommodationist principles.2 " Under accommodation, the Court
"has long recognized that the government may (and sometimes must)
accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without violating the
Establishment Clause."2 5 In short, the Court now permits the government to
be friendlier towards religion and cites "accommodation" as its justification.
Accommodation has been particularly important in cases involving land of
cultural, historical, and religious importance because public ownership of land
often creates "barriers to religious worship" and the government may
"accommodate" certain parties to assist them in overcoming those burdens
without violating the Establishment Clause.20 6 Accommodating religious
groups or practices that depend on specific religious sites has become a
legitimate and important factor in several courts' analyses."0 7 Accommodation
has effectively broadened the gap in which the government may act without
violating the Establishment Clause.
Second, Lyng limits the applicability of the Free Exercise Clause in landbased cases, which effectively widens the gap between the clauses from the
other end as well. The Lyng Court held that the language "prohibiting the free
exercise" of religion in the First Amendment did not preclude the government
from adversely affecting "an integral and indispensable part of Indian
religious conceptualization and practice."' 8 So, whatever else it meant,
"prohibit" did not prevent the government from making an internal decision
that would be a defacto elimination of the ability to practice one's religion.
203. See, e.g., FARBER, supra note 3, at 292. In some contexts, the Religion Clause may still
be in a tug of war as described by 'Farber. However, this note only addresses the issue in the
context of land-based religion cases.
204. See discussion supra Part II.A.l.d.
205. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144 (1987).
206. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1455 (D. Wyo. 1998).
207. Natural Arch & Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1222 (D. Utah 2002);
Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Indep. Petroleum Ass'n of Am., No. 0035349, 2001 WL
470022 (9th Cir. May 3, 2001) (not selected for publication).
208. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 442 (1988).
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Right or wrong, Lyng created a formidable hurdle for any plaintiff challenging
a government decision pertaining to sacred sites, which effectively broadens
the government's discretion when making such decisions.
C. The Gap Is the Best Interpretationof the Religion Clauses
Whether or not one agrees with the Court's respective interpretations of the
Religion Clauses, the existence of a gap between them is a permissible
interpretation of the text, promotes democracy, and preserves rights and
freedoms valuable to all Americans.
Nothing in the text of the First Amendment requires one of the clauses to
apply if the other does not. The First Amendment separates the two Religion
Clauses with a comma, just like it separates the Freedom of Speech and
Freedom of the Press Clauses, which are independent from one another and
protect different rights. Admittedly, both of the Religion Clauses speak to the
issue of religion. However, the Religion Clauses are merely two of many
clauses in the Amendment that protect the rights of individuals against
governmental power. 209 The Establishment Clause protects an individual
against a state-established religion. The Free Exercise Clause protects an
individual's right to practice his religion. If one were to combine the clauses
they might be said to protect an individual's religious interests from state
coercion. The First Amendment also protects the rights to free speech, to
freedom of the press, to peaceably assemble, and to petition the government
for a redress of grievances. Similar to the rest of the First Amendment and
much of the Bill of Rights, both of the Religion Clauses seek to safeguard the
rights of the individual against the powers of the state. The text of the
Amendment does not dictate that the two clauses are opposing sides of the
same coin.
Nonetheless, the clauses have historically been interpreted by the Court as
existing in frequent tension with one another.210 Under such an interpretation,
one of the two will generally apply to a given situation. However, this is a
general rule to which the Court has recognized exceptions. 1
In addition to being textually supportable, the existence of a gap between
the Religion Clauses is the most democratic interpretation. Acknowledgement
by the judiciary that there are situations in which neither clause will apply

209. These clauses have been applied to the states and state actors via the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
210. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (citations omitted).
211. Id. at 718-19.
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leaves the decision-making authority in the hands of the legislative or
executive branches, which are accountable to the people.
Although Native Americans and other groups with land-based religious
practices may be hesitant to leave their religious practices to the whim of the
majority," 2 the political process may be their best avenue to protect religious
sites. Under the Court's current Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
government actors are free to protect and accommodate religious sites, so long
as that protection is not so obtuse as to violate one of the Court's tests.
Indeed, since a majority of the Court has embraced accommodation, it is now
very difficult for government actors to violate the Establishment Clause when
protecting religious sites, especially when the actors have cultural, historical,
or preservationist purposes to support their decision.
To date, however, the Court has not permitted Native Americans to use the
Free Exercise Clause as a sword when agencies act unfavorably towards their
religious sites. Writing for the majority in Smith, Justice Scalia stated that
"[i]t would doubtless be unconstitutional ...to prohibit bowing down before
a golden calf."2" 3 Similarly, it would be unconstitutional for the government
to pass a law prohibiting individuals from bowing down before a sacred
tree.2" 4 While the state may not statutorily prohibit an individual from bowing
before that tree, however, Lyng stands for the proposition that the state may
cut down or destroy that tree, so long as it has some non-discriminatory reason
for doing so." 5 While the destruction of that tree may in fact prohibit that
individual from practicing his religion, the Court refused to recognize such
destruction as "prohibiting religion" within the meaning of the First
Amendment.2 16
Under Lyng, the government may conduct itself in such a way that
incidentally creates a de facto prohibition of religion without violating the
Free Exercise Clause.21 7 However, determining whether or not a particular
action will in fact prohibit a religion is often a complicated task, one that may
be beyond the scope of the judiciary." 8 In Lyng, for example, the Indians
themselves were far from unanimous in opposing the construction of the road
212. Understandable with harsh decisions such as Lyng (see discussion in part II(b) above).
213. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,877-78 (1990).
214. Analogous to the golden calf example, where the government "sought to ban such acts
or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons." Id. at 877.
215. The non-discriminatory reason in Lyng was the building of a road where the tree once
stood. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988).
216. Id. at451-52.
217. Id. at450.
218. Seeid. at451.
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and there was some uncertainty that the construction of the road would "be so
disruptive that it will doom their religion. 21 9
Determining whether or not a particular decision will in fact prohibit
religious practices would require the courts to "weigh the value of every
religious belief and practice that is said to be threatened by any government
program. '22 ° This would require courts, and not the individual worshipper, to
determine the centrality of each belief and the degree of harm threatened by
the government action. 2 Such a requirement is problematic because a broad
range of government activities will always be considered essential to the
religious well-being of some citizens, while other citizens will find the same
activities deeply offensive or incompatible with their religious beliefs.222 The
judiciary is ill-equipped and not authorized to make such decisions on the
competing demands of government.
In addition to exceeding the scope of the judiciary, a strict reading of the
Free Exercise Clause would preserve the balance of power between the
branches of government. The executive and legislative branches are better
equipped to make the important policy decisions described above. Indeed,
Native Americans have shown some degree of success in influencing non223
judicial government actors to accommodate their religious needs.
Theoretically, the judiciary is not subject to such political pressure. Also,
Native Americans and other religious minorities should be reluctant to grant
the judiciary broader interpretive powers because such an expansion would
place at risk other important rights and liberties.
Judges are unelected, unaccountable, and unrepresentative of the people.224
These attributes of the judiciary are necessary to enable judges to be the
guardians of the rights and freedoms of those outside the favor of the
219. Id.
220. Id. at 457.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 452.
223. For examples of Native Americans influencing an agency's decision through political
pressure, see Lyng, 485 U.S. at 454 (while the Forest Service constructed a burdensome road,
it did so in a way that would mitigate interference with the rituals of the Native Americans);
Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 972 (9th Cir. 2004) (Native Americans
influenced ADOT to deny a destructive commercial source permit); Natural Arch & Bridge
Soc 'y v. Alston, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1213 (D. Utah 2002) (National Park Service sought to
foster a "cooperative relationship" with the Navajo tribe); Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass 'n v.
Babbitt,2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1450 (D. Wyo. 1998) (National Park Service sought to protect a
sacred site during the important month of June).

224.

ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW

5 (1990).
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majority. 221 However, in order to protect all citizens from powers of an
unaccountable judiciary, "judges must consider themselves bound by law that
is independent of their own views of the desirable.,, 226 While it maybe unjust
or undesirable for the government to engage in conduct that hinders the
religious practices of land-based worshippers, as in Lyng, judges should not
try to resolve matters that are not within their legal purview. While the ends
are often noble, such as protecting the freedoms of religious minorities, to
accomplish them by stretching the Constitution places at risk the rights and
liberties of all. If the judiciary may disregard the law to assist religious
minorities, then it may also use its expanded powers to harm them. Either
judges are bound by the law, or they are not. Alexander Hamilton or James
Madison succinctly captured one of the greatest protections against tyrannical
be unsafe in the number
government, stating, "the liberties of America cannot
22 7
of hands proposed by the federal Constitution.
V. Conclusion
The previous discussion demonstrates that there are competing demands on
the least democratic branch of the American government. On the one hand,
thejudiciary must protect the rights of those outside majority favor by limiting
the power of the majority when specific provisions of the Constitution are
triggered. One the other hand, the judiciary must respect the limitations
imposed on it and defer to the democratic branches of government when the
law does not apply. Only by conscientiously maintaining this balance can the
judiciary protect both the rights of those outside majority favor as well as the
liberty of the people to govern themselves. By interpreting the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment in such a way as to create a gap between
them, the Court properly maintains this balance. The Court's current
jurisprudence on the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses constructs a
floor and a ceiling that effectively limits the power of the majority in dealing
with religion, but still allows democracy to flourish in the broad gap that
exists between them.

225.
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number
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THE FEDERALIST No. 55 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (speaking to the
of total people in the House of Representatives).
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